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Abstract— This paper gives a brief introduction about what 
BEC (Business Email Compromise) is and why we should be 
concerned about. In addition, it presents 2 examples, Ubiquity 
and Peebles Media Group, which have been chosen to analyse 
the phenomena of BEC and underpin how universal BEC threat 
is for all companies. 
The psychology behind this scam has been, then, studied. In 
particular, the Big Five Framework has been analysed to 
understand how personality traits play an important role in 
Social Engineering-based attacks. Furthermore, the 6 basic 
principles of influence, by Cialdini, have been presented to show 
which strategies are adopted in such scam.  
The paper follows with the analysis of the BEC impacts and 
the incident evaluation and, finally, with the description of some 
precautions, that companies should undertake in order to 
mitigate and reduce the likelihood of a Business Email 
Compromise. 
Keywords— Business Email Compromise, Social 
Engineering, Cyber attacks. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
BEC (Business Email Compromise) is a sophisticated 
email fraud which targets companies and businesses which 
usually work with foreign suppliers and use wire transfers as 
regular way to transfer funds (Bakarich and Baranek, 2019) 
(FBI, 2019) (Connell, 2019). 
These scams very often include the compromise of 
legitimate business email accounts to perform unauthorised 
transfers of funds, although sometimes other variations imply 
requesting personal information or gift cards (Bakarich and 
Baranek, 2019) (FBI, 2019) (FBI, 2017). 
First labelled an “emerging threat” in 2013 when FBI 
started tracking cases, BEC is increasingly sophisticated and 
it constitutes now a global issue (FBI, 2017) (Peter & 
Associates, 2019) (Barracuda, 2020). According to FBI, “BEC 
is a severe and global threat, and criminals are ever-more 
honing their techniques to exploit unsuspecting victims” (FBI, 
2017). It’s estimated that in 2019, according to a study 
conducted by Beazley Breach Response Services, BEC has 
increased by 133% compared to the previous year (Tuttle, 
2018) (Barracuda, 2020). 
In addition, it also underlined that almost the 25% of all 
the incidents reported by firms so far are attributable to BEC 
(Barracuda, 2020). 
There are 5 main types of BEC scams (Remorin, Flores 
and Matsukawa, 2020) (Peter & Associates, 2019); the most 
common one is the CEO Fraud by which criminals 
impersonate high-level business executives by either 
compromising or spoofing their e-mail accounts. The others 
are “the bogus invoice scheme”, “the account compromise 
scheme”, “the attorney impersonalisation scheme”, and “the 
data theft scheme”. 
BEC exploits 2 types of weaknesses within an organisation 
(Peter & Associates, 2019):  
• Technical vulnerabilities. The exploitation of them is 
through hacking and it can be mitigated with firewall, servers 
and anti-intrusion systems (Peter & Associates, 2019).   
• People vulnerabilities, “the weakest link”. Bad actors 
are aware that exploiting people, using psychological tricks, is 
easier than exploiting the system, using only technical skills 
(Peter & Associates, 2019) (Ferreira et al., 2015).  
There are specific tactics, more focused on psychology 
than computer science, as this paper will show, that criminals 
employ to exploit the victims (Ferreira et al., 2015). By 
analysing what about a communication inspires confidence in 
the recipient, hackers target areas that will make people trust 
the correspondence. These tactics are known as SE (Social 
Engineering), and BEC belongs to it (Peter & Associates, 
2019). 
The first real-world example of BEC incident, this paper is 
going to deal with, comes from a U.S. public company, 
Ubiquiti Networks (Bakarich and Baranek, 2019), a 
technology business which sells products aimed to improve 
and maintain virtual private networks, surveillance systems 
and network security (Ubiquity, 2018).  
In addition, it will be provided another case where the 
victim of this attacks has been Peebles Media Group “one of 
Scotland’s leading independent media companies with a 
diverse portfolio of high profile B2B and consumer titles, as 
well as an events division that holds several key industry 
awards and trade events” (Peebles Media Group, 2017). 
These cases have been selected as relevant to fully 
understand the psychology and the impact behind a BEC 
attack; These cases emphasise how universal BEC threat is for 
all companies (Connell, 2019); in spite Ubiquiti’s focus on 
Internet and Host security, it fell victim to one of the most 
common kinds of BEC attack (Bakarich and Baranek, 2019). 
Finally, the second example shows how the impacts could 
be even more severe than the losses (Wanca and Cannon, 
2020) (Sussman, 2019).  
The Pebbles Media Group’s employee, who had been 
cheated by a CEO fraud, was fired and even been sued for 
more than 130.000 £ by her company to recover the money 
lost in this cyber attack (Sussman, 2019) (BBC News, 2019) 
(Moskvitch, 2019). 
 
II. INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION  
UBIQUITY CASE 
Ubiquity is a company which sells products to ensure 
online/offline protection and security and it has wholly owned 
subsidiaries in Hong Kong, China, Lithuania, Poland and a 
few other countries around the world (Ubiquity, 2018).  
On the 19th of May 2015, a person, working in the finance 
department of Ubiquity, received an email which, he thought, 
came from an executive of the same company. (Bakarich and 
Baranek, 2019) (Forbes, 2016). 
Said email instructed the employee to transfer money due 
to the acquisition Ubiquity was conducting at that period. In 
addition, it also stated that on the requested transfer, Tom 
Evans, an outside attorney from the international law firm of 
Latham & Watkins, would follow up with the instructions for 
approving the payments. The finance employee had to follow 
Tom’s instructions (Bakarich and Baranek, 2019).  
Following the first email, a second one was received by the 
employee on the same day and it instructed him to proceed 
immediately with the payment (Bakarich and Baranek, 2019). 
The victim, as per the instruction, wired the money from 
Ubiquiti’s Hong Kong bank account.  
Over the next 17 days, the victim followed the instructions 
of the fake executive and made 14 transfers ($46.7 million) to 
foreign accounts which were held by third parties in China, 
Russia, Poland and Hungary (Ubiquiti, 2015) (Forbes, 2016).  
However, at that time, Ubiquiti was not conducting any 
acquisition. Investigators found out later that those emails, 
instructing the victim to wire transfer money, were sent by 
criminals (Bakarich and Baranek, 2019). 
They looked similar to a real one and included the 
electronic signature of the company Latham & Watkins’, but 
they had been sent from an e-mail account which ended with 
the domain: @consultant.com (Ubiquiti, 2015) (Forbes, 
2016).  
On the 6th of August 2015, the company Ubiquity 
informed the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) that 
they suffered a BEC scam, involving “employee 
impersonation and fraudulent requests from an outside entity” 
(Ubiquiti, 2015) (Bakarich and Baranek, 2019) (Forbes, 
2016). 
 
PEEBLES MEDIA GROUP 
Peebles Media Group is a leading independent publisher 
with experience in the Scottish B2B and B2C markets. They 
offer media solutions across digital platforms, print and 
events. B2B titles include Scottish Licensed Trade News, 
Scottish Grocer, Project Scotland, Project Plant, Packaging 
Scotland and Envirotec. B2C titles include Homes & Interiors 
Scotland and Tie the Knot Scotland (Peebles Media Group, 
2017). 
The victim who was cheated by BEC scam was Reilly, a 
finance department employee. She got different emails which 
seemed to come from the company director Yvonne Bremner, 
her manager, in the Summer of 2015 while he was on vacation 
in Tenerife (Sussman, 2019) (BBC News, 2019) (Moskvitch, 
2019). 
Those emails asked for the help of Reilly to transfer 
$200,000 via wire transfer, from one account to another, as he 
was temporary unable because on holiday (Sussman, 2019). 
Reilly made the transfer as requested, unaware that those 
emails, in fact, were sent by criminals who knew Bremner was 
off (BBC News, 2019). 
Some days later, another finance employee contacted 
Yvonne Bremner in Tenerife and discovered he had not 
requested that transfer (Sussman, 2019). 
They, thus, found out the company had been victim of the 
BEC cyberattack (Moskvitch, 2019). 
Just after the discovery, the bank of the company managed 
to recover a part of the money by blocking the transaction. 
However, criminals succeeded in keeping $138,000 of the 
transfer (Sussman, 2019). 
Peebles Media Group responded to the incident by firing 
Reilly and then suing her for the lost $138,000 (Sussman, 
2019) (BBC News, 2019). 
 
III. INCIDENT ANALYSIS 
Every BEC attack, like for those occurred in the already 
presented examples, follows a similar pattern and rules aimed 
to increase the likelihood and the success of it (Barracuda, 
2020). 
 
PSYCHOLOGY BEHIND THESE ATTACKS 
BEC attack aims to overcome the security controls by 
exploiting weaknesses in human behaviour and decision 
making (Uebelacker, 2020). These scams usually rely on a 
mixture of tactics to influence and persuade decision making 
such as authority, time pressure, and tone (Dhamija, Tygar and 
Hearst, 2006). BEC, along with phishing, claims to come from 
a reliable and trustful source, with corporate logo and with its 
name which seems legitimate and trustworthy (Public-Private 
Analytic Exchange Programme, 2018) (Wanca and Cannon, 
2020) (Dhamija, Tygar and Hearst, 2006). In addition, BEC 
email often contains an element of time pressure and urgency 
and it may also prey on user’s fear of something. The tone of 
these messages usually involves persuasive and polite 
statements to further manipulate the decision making (Public-
Private Analytic Exchange Programme, 2018) (Segura, 2017).  
This section is going to examine the correlation between 
the response to BEC scams and the Big five personality traits 
(Halevi, Lewis and Memon, 2013). 
In the classical decisional theory, decision making under 
risk is assumedly based on logic. As a result, reasonable 
people should take rational choices. However, it has been 
showed that humans’ decision tends to be biased (Uebelacker, 
2020). 
A criminal may, hence, manipulate the decision-making 
process (Guadagno and Cialdini, 2005) (Cialdini, 2009) 
(Sagarin et al., 2002). 
BEC fraud appeals to different human vulnerabilities, like 
the desire for immediate gain, to help others and to be thanked 
by the manager. It has been shown that certain people have 
“victim personalities” which lead them to be more vulnerable 
to the Social Engineering scams (Halevi, Lewis and Memon, 
2013). 
 
BIG FIVE FRAMEWORK 
In psychology, personality is defined as a person’s 
relatively stable feelings, thoughts, and behavioural patterns. 
These are predominantly determined by inheritance, social 
and environmental influence, and experience, and are 
therefore unique for every individual (McCrae and John, 
1992). 
Personality is a consistent pattern of how people respond 
to stimuli in their environment and their attitude towards 
different events. The Five Factor model is used for 
multidimensional measures of personality: Neuroticism, 
Extroversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and 
Conscientiousness (Uebelacker, 2020).  
The literature in this field provides a relation between 
personality traits and SE in general. There is a correlation 
between personality traits and the probability of being cheated 
by a social engineering attack. For some traits of personality, 
indeed, the likelihood of the successful attack may increase or 
decrease. That’s why BEC attack, which is a social 
engineering attack, it’s a high targeted attack where victims 
are studied carefully (Barracuda, 2020).  
Here the big five framework traits (Uebelacker, 2020) 
(Halevi, Lewis and Memon, 2013): 
• Conscientiousness: since conscientious people adhere to 
existing rules, it is assumed that they are more vulnerable 
to Social Engineering techniques that exploit rules, social 
norms, and policies (Halevi, Lewis and Memom, 2013). 
• Extraversion: SE attacks using liking or social proof can 
work well on extraverted individuals as they rely on social 
aspects because extraversion relates to sociability, a sub-
trait of extraversion (Uebelacker, 2020). The excitement 
seeking is one sub-trait that can lead to greater 
vulnerability for the scarcity principle – getting 
something scarce is usually described as exciting 
(Uebelacker, 2020). 
• Agreeableness: individuals who are more trusting raise 
fewer concerns about privacy invasion by location-based 
services, which we assume to be generalisable to fewer 
privacy concerns. We predict higher SE vulnerability 
because of the higher likelihood of disclosing private 
information if a social engineer established a trust 
relationship (Uebelacker, 2020). 
• Openness to Experience: openness to experiences and 
strong fantasy lead to higher susceptibility. On the other 
hand, openness is associated with technological 
experience and computer proficiency. Therefore, 
openness reduces SE vulnerability as more digitally 
literate users better detect SE attacks (Halevi, Lewis and 
Memom, 2013) (Uebelacker, 2020).  
• Neuroticism: Parrish et al. (2019) propose that computer 
anxiety, which is associated with neuroticism, may 
protect regarding to computer-based SE attacks like 
phishing because neurotic users act with more caution. In 
general, they established that neurotic individuals are less 
susceptible to most SE attacks. Neuroticism can act as a 
barrier since the underlying pessimism often assumes the 
worst in any situation (Uebelacker, 2020).  
 
INFLUENCE 
Personality traits play an important role when it comes to 
social engineering; however, there are some tricks used to 
manipulate and influence the victims (Uebelacker, 2020) 
(Ferreira et al., 2015). Some strategies of Social Engineering, 
adopted in areas such as marketing, were analysed by Cialdini. 
He grouped them into 6 categories, called “the 6 basic 
principles of influence” (Ferreira et al., 2015). 
To demonstrate that Cialdini’s principles are applicable in 
context of BEC and more generally to SE, they have been 
applied to Ubiquity and Peebles Media Group’s cases 
(Uebelacker, 2020). 
The six principles consist of (Uebelacker, 2020): 
- Authority: People tend to comply to authorities even if 
they are persuaded to behave unethically (Mosley, 2020) 
(Jakobsson, 2014) (Uebelacker, 2020). There are 2 kinds 
of Authority: 
o Authority based on expertise, such as police. 
o Authority based on the position occupied within a 
company, like the finance executive for the 
Ubiquity’s case or the manager for the Peebles 
Media Group’s one. 
- Social Proof: Adapting behaviours or beliefs to be 
“socially accepted”; it implies a high level of trust 
towards people who share similar ideas (Uebelacker, 
2020).  
- Scarcity: People tend to assign more value to less available 
opportunities. This is applicable also for requests which 
claim to have a high sense of urgency, where victims 
must act quickly. This principle is correlated also to the 
idea of fear (“I act quickly because, otherwise, I get in 
trouble”) and to the one of distraction (acting quickly 
could lead to mistakes or could make victims overlook 
the scam cues) (Brehm, 1966). 
- Commitment & Consistency: People strive for consistency 
in their commitments. In addition, getting 
customers/colleagues to publicly commit makes it more 
likely they will follow through (Guadagno and Cialdini, 
2005). 
- Liking: People prefer to say ‘yes’ to what they know and 
like. The employees tend to accept the request coming 
(or pretending to come) from their managers (Bujold, 
2002). 
- Reciprocity: Reciprocity makes establishing trust with 
others and refers to our need for equity. The power of 
reciprocity can be so high that the target would return an 
even greater favour than what was received (Public-
Private Analytic Exchange Programme, 2018).  
The following table shows how these principles of 
persuasion have been applied to the cited cases: 
 
 
 IV. FURTHER INCIDENT ANALYSIS 
The Ubiquity and Peebles Media Group’s examples 
showed how the impact could be potentially violent when it 
comes to falling under a BEC scam. In addition, the data 
obtained through these scams can also lead to further 
victimisation (Wanca and Cannon, 2020). For instance, if an 
employee’s personal information (such as name, email 
address, phone number) is posted online, other criminals could 
utilise this information to commit other crimes against the 
victim (e.g., stalking, harassment, burglary). 
Based on the analysed cases and the online literature 
regarding BEC attacks, here below the most relevant impacts 
this scam leads to (Peter & Associates, 2019) (Wanca and 
Cannon, 2020):  
• Lost Time: recovering from a BEC attack can be 
confusing, time confusing, and generally inconvenient for 
victims. Depending on the type of damage caused by it, 
victims can spend anywhere from a few hours to many 
months or year resolving the associated problems. 
• Trauma: BEC, along with SE attacks, can cause significant 
emotional distress (e.g., denial, loss of trust, frustration, 
fear, anger, powerlessness, helplessness, embarrassment, 
depression, sleep disturbances). Some theorise that 
cybercrime victimisation, such as identity theft, can be 
more harmful to victims than crimes like property theft;  
 
one can replace property, but it is not possible to acquire 
a new identity. Further, BEC victims can experience 
secondary victimisation by others who blame the victims 
for falling for the attack. 
• Financial loss: victims can incur both direct (i.e., value of 
goods, services, or cash obtained) and indirect (e.g., legal 
fees, bounced checks, postage) financial loss resulting 
from BEC attacks. In the Ubiquity case, the financial loss 
was $46.7 million. In addition, the employers of BEC 
victims can experience financial losses related to 
decreased productivity (see below), business disruption, 
isolating malware and credential compromises, and the 
cost of data breaches. 
• Social Consequences: victimisation can cause strain on 
personal and family relationship and reputational damage. 
For example, if cybercriminals gain access to a victim’s 
email, they can uncover information about personal 
relationship or embarrassing photos or videos that may be 
leaked to the public. Family or friends could also become 
the targets of cybercriminals. 
• Business consequences: both intellectual property and 
customer data can be at risk when a BEC attack occurs. 
In addition to financial loss, such attack can damage the 
reputation and credibility of a business. Consumer may 
loose trust in the business, which can lead the company to 
loose its customer base. 
Ubiquity’s case Peebles Media Group’s case
Authority
The emails received by the employee came from an 
executive with electronic signature and Latham & 
Watkins’ details.
The email received by the employee came 
from her boss and had company logo, the 
mail has been spoofed and appeared to be 
very similar to the real one.
Social Proof
The task of the victim implied the collaboration 
with an outside attorney, Tom Evans from the 
international law firm of Latham & Watkins. 
The employee complied with the task 
because “other people would have done it”
Scarcity
The victim received, on the same day of the first 
email, a second one which instructed him to make 
the first payment immediately.
The victim received an email from “her 
boss” which ordered her to make the 
payment immediately.
Commitment & Consistency
The employee wanted to act for the wealth of the 
company and was committed to his position.
The employee wanted to act for the wealth 
of the company and was committed to her 
position. 
Liking
The employee wanted to help the company and 
acting quickly would have been appreciated by 
them.
Reilly wanted to act quickly and help his 
manager who was currently on holiday.
Reciprocity
The employee got involved in an important task 
and wanted to reward the company by acting as per 
instructions 
Reilly got involved in a task from her boss 
and wanted to reply straight
• Lost productivity: the time it takes to recover from a BEC 
scam and the trauma inflicted can result in decreased 
employee productivity. It is estimated that non-IT 
employees spend an evarage of 4.16 hours per year 
dealing with such attacks. 
 
V. INCIDENT EVALUATION AND SUMMARY 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RISK MITIGATION  
Ubiquity and Peebles media group’s cases emphasise how 
universal BEC threat is for all companies. Both BEC attacks 
were performed using the 6 Cialdini’s persuasion principles 
and addressing specific employees whose personality traits 
would have facilitated such outcome. 
Getting back to section 3, some personality traits, such as 
neuroticism, Conscientiousness, Extraversion and 
Agreeableness have been found to be correlated to BEC 
(Parrish et al., 2009). 
Easy-going, careless, outgoing, nervous, naïve people are 
found to be, indeed, the most hit targets by criminals and the 
cited attacks were successful due to particular victim’s 
personality traits, in particular (Parrish et al., 2009): 
- Extraversion and Conscientiousness are correlated to BEC 
vulnerability and, according to the study of (Halevi, 
Lewis and Memon, 2013), this is also gender-based, being 
particularly significant for women rather than men. 
- Openness to experience, from one hand, may lead to a 
higher tendency of sharing and disclosing personal 
valuable information; however, from the other hand, it 
could also lead to an increase of the experience in IT, 
reducing thus the likelihood of falling victim to BEC 
scheme (Halevi, Lewis and Memon, 2013). 
- Agreeableness may also constitute a vulnerability because 
friendly and compassionate people could perform a 
request to conform with the company and/or manager 
(Halevi, Lewis and Memon, 2013). 
In order to mitigate and minimise the outcome of such 
scams, in Ubiquity and Peebles Media Group’s cases, some 
steps should have been taken (Peter & Associates, 2019): 
- Check and Communication: Both employees should have 
checked the unexpected emails sent by high-level 
executives and got a secondary verification of the request 
asking directly to the person in charge of it (Remorin, 
Flores and Matsukawa, 2020), “The best way to avoid 
being exploited is to verify the authenticity of requests to 
send money by walking into the CEO’s office or speaking 
to him or her directly on the phone. Don’t rely on e-mail 
alone.” (FBI, 2017). They also should have checked the 
changes in vendor payment details by using a secondary 
sign-off. 
- Employee awareness (Remorin, Flores and Matsukawa, 
2020) (Biskup and Weil, 2020). Both Ubiquity and 
Peebles Media Group should have raised an awareness 
training aimed to understand and detect these scams.  
-  
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The previous section dealt with how said scams may have 
been mitigated; this one, instead, is going to present some 
recommendations and tactics to reduce and minimise BEC 
attack, a very common threat for companies and enterprises 
(Peter & Associates, 2019) (KnowBe4, 2020).  
As a result, Deloitte performed a research on BEC attacks 
and focused on the mitigation of such attacks: 
In particular, they stressed different steps to undertake in 
companies in order to mitigate and reduce the likelihood of a 
Business Email Compromise (Remorin, Flores and 
Matsukawa, 2020) (Biskup and Weil, 2020): 
1. Train of employees in order to detect BEC attacks. 
Employees have to be trained about how BEC scheme 
works and how criminals structure their attacks using 
real and harmful persuasive techniques (Remorin, Flores 
and Matsukawa, 2020). 
Especially important in preventing BEC is employees 
training which makes them be aware about risks, 
implications and tactics used by criminals.   
Moreover, a well-structured training course fosters a 
sense of responsibility in the organisation (Biskup and 
Weil, 2020). 
2. Creation of a culture of compliance. 
BEC scams may not be mitigated just by training, 
criminals keep improving their tactics making the 
identification of them very difficult. As a result, 
compliance should go in parallel with training (Remorin, 
Flores and Matsukawa, 2020).  
Compliance would allow the employees to follow up a 
secure procedure, which in some cases would unmask 
attempted frauds, although the request comes from the 
chief officer of the company (Biskup and Weil, 2020). 
3. Build a technical defence. 
Although BEC is effective due to its sophisticated 
psychological pattern, it is not considered technically 
advanced; its origin, indeed, usually comes from 
phishing or spoofing email (Public-Private Analytic 
Exchange Programme, 2018) (Biskup and Weil, 2020). 
These scams could be prevented by implementing 
application-based multi-factor authentication (MFA) 
and virtual private networks (VPNs). 
In addition, the communication via e-mails could be 
secured by encrypting the emails exchange. This would 
allow a protection against spoofing and phishing emails 
(Biskup and Weil, 2020). 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper gives a brief introduction about what BEC is 
and why we should be concerned about. In addition, the first 
section introduces the 2 examples which have been chosen to 
analyse the phenomena of BEC: Ubiquity and Peebles Media 
Group’s cases in order to underpin how universal BEC threat 
is for all companies.  
In the second section, instead, the psychology behind this 
scam has been studied. In particular, the Big Five Framework 
has been analysed to understand how personality traits play an 
important role in social engineering-based attacks. In addition, 
the 6 basic principles of influence, by Cialdini, have been 
presented to show which strategies are adopted in such scam.  
The third chapter aims to further analyse the incidents by 
dealing with the impacts that BEC scam may have on 
enterprises, businesses and, especially, on people. Among loss 
of time, money, productivity, it could lead to emotional 
distress, frustration, anger, embarrassment or victimisation. 
The incident evaluation section aims to describe the 
personality traits of the victims of such cases. Ubiquity and 
Peebles Media Group’s victims are, in fact, unknown but, 
basing on the literature of cyberpsychology, they have been 
analysed and the most hit target’s traits have been presented. 
Moreover, some precautions which should have been taken 
are stressed. 
Finally, the last section presents 3 steps that companies 
should undertake in order to mitigate and reduce the likelihood 
of a Business Email Compromise. 
 
VIII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE PROJECTS 
This paper presents some limitations; the principal one 
regards the documentation of the occurred incidents. The 
volume of literature regarding the Ubiquity and Peebles Media 
Group’s scams is very low and it lacks important details, such 
as the description of the victims’ personality, which could 
have been very useful for the psychological analysis of said 
cases. 
In addition, scammers are not presented thus it has been 
impossible to introduce an important field of 
cyberpsychology: the bad actor, his psychology and why he 
behaves in such way. 
While doing researches for this paper, other interesting 
topics have been raised; however, due to the words limit, it has 
not been possible to analyse another related domain of this 
topic. Future projects relating BEC will focus on: 
- Comparison of the personality traits with the six 
principle of persuasion and analysis of how every 
trait responds to each principle. 
- Analysis of the scammers and their psychology. 
- Analysis of the steps by which the bad actor carries 
out the attack, from the reconnaissance to the 
exploitation (Public-Private Analytic Exchange 
Programme, 2018).  
- Comparison of the trends and impacts of BEC before 
and during the COVID-19 period to understand how 
people react to such scam during a period of crisis. 
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